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Dynamic effects of Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
Abstract
This paper analyses the long-run effects of Estonia’s 2000 Income Tax Act with a dynamic
general equilibrium model. Specifically, we consider the impact of the shift from an
imputation system to one where companies only pay taxes on distributed profits. Balanced
growth paths, transitional dynamics and welfare costs are computed. Our results indicate
that the 2000 Income Tax Act leads to higher per capita income and investment, but lower
welfare. A sensitivity analysis shows the results are rather robust.
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Michael Funke and Holger Strulik
Taxation, growth and welfare:
Dynamic effects of Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa käsitellään Virossa vuonna 2000 toteutetun verouudistuksen pitkän
aikavälin vaikutuksia dynaamisen yleisen tasapainon mallin avulla. Siinä keskitytään
yritysverotuksen uudistukseen, jonka jälkeen yritykset maksavat veroa ainoastaan
jakaessaan voittoja. Työssä lasketaan uudistukseen liittyvän tasapainoisen kasvun ura,
siirtymä tasapainouralle ja hyvinvointikustannukset. Tulosten mukaan vuoden 2000
verouudistus johtaa korkeampaan per capita -tulotasoon ja suurempiin investointeihin,
mutta aheikompaan hyvinvointiin. Tulokset pysyvät samoina, vaikka analyysin
lähtöoletuksia muutettaisiin.
Asiasanat: kasvu, hyvinvointi, verotus, verouudistus, Viro.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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1  Introduction
 The debate over how favourably tax codes should treat capital is an established part of
political discourse in many countries. The controversy has been particularly vigorous in the
setting of tax reform agendas of transition economies. The World Bank (2000) suggests
that the design of tax systems should be guided by tested theory and the lessons of
experience, i.e. a broad-based tax system with low statutory rates. This approach advocates
the elimination of tax exemptions for favoured enterprises to harden budget constraints,
reduction of the tax burden on viable enterprises, encouraging investment and promotion
of long-term growth.
Economists have only recently developed tools to assess the impacts of tax reform on
long-term growth. Chamley (1981, 1986) presented the earliest general equilibrium
analysis of the effects of capital taxation and focusing on the welfare consequences of
eliminating a tax on capital. Judd (1987) followed with a different approach that compared
the welfare cost associated with the taxation of capital and labour income. Both studies
(and numerous others) found significant welfare gains associated with the reduction of
capital income taxation. Most researchers, however, quickly realised matters were more
complicated. For example, neither study allowed for feedback to the long-run steady state
growth rate of the economy, relying instead on models where the growth rate of the
economy is exogenously determined. In other words, the reduction of capital income
taxation only has transitory impacts upon the growth rate as the economy adjusts towards a
new steady state.
The development of endogenous growth models in the late 1980s and 1990s were
intended to equip economists with the wherewithal to investigate the possible effects tax
policy might have on an economy’s long-run growth rate. These new models, pioneered by
Romer (1986), Lucas (1990), Ortiguera (1998), Rebelo (1991) and Kim (1998), were
motivated by the desire to construct dynamic general equilibrium models that address the
steady-state consequences of specific economic policies. In such endogenous growth
models, taxes potentially play a greater role. While there are a number of channels through
which taxes may affect the growth rate, the growth effects are difficult to detect in cross-
sectional data [see, for example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993)]. Jones (1995) extended the
search, but also failed to find, growth effects from various policies. Despite problems
associated with measurement error and short samples, this evidence as a whole casts
serious doubt on the growth effects that endogenous growth models with scale effects
generate. In the light of such scanty empirical evidence, we revert to consideration of an
exogenous growth model.
The discussion in the literature suggests to us a need for a formal growth model that
encompasses scale effects and can assess the relative magnitudes of such effects. In this
paper, we transpose to Estonia Strulik’s (2003a) growth model that was originally used to
analyse Germany’s recent corporate tax reform. The objectives of this exercise are, first, to
outline a dynamic supply-side-oriented general equilibrium model that allows us to address
the question of how changes in the capital income tax rate affect the well-being of
households, and second, to illustrate the potential magnitude of the gains that accompany
Estonia’s 2000 income tax act. This approach also allows us to address a widely neglected
issue  transition dynamics.
Various growth models show lower taxation unambiguously increases investment and
economic growth. Few, however, indicate such tax policy has a positive impact on welfare,
i.e. the models do not derive the foregone consumption necessary to achieve a distinct andMichael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
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higher steady-state growth path. Thus, even if the theoretical growth literature indicates
that lower taxation results in a new higher steady-state income, there may well be only
minute, or even negative, welfare gains if the shift involves large adjustment costs and high
foregone consumption [e.g. Lucas (1990) and Strulik (2003b)].
In the following analysis, we consider Estonia’s 2000 income tax reform in the long
run, taking into account general equilibrium feedback effects. In an earlier partial
equilibrium paper [Funke (2002)], Tobin’s q theory of investment was applied to analyse
the investment effects of the 2000 tax reform in Estonia. The numerical simulations of the
calibrated model find a 6.1% increase in the Estonian equipment capital stock. While the
model provides clear insights into an important policy issue at relatively low cost in terms
of technical complexity, it is limited for our purposes here because it abstracts from
general equilibrium responses when evaluating the tax policy. It does not quantify the
economic benefits and costs of the reform arising from macroeconomic repercussions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the Estonian
2000 income tax reform. Section 3 provides a survey of current corporate tax rates in Eastern
Europe. Section 4 lays out the baseline model. Section 5 proposes a numerical exercise, wherein we
calibrate the model, provide sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter specification and
compute welfare costs. Following analysis of the benchmark model, our focus shifts to foreign
direct investment in section 6. Section 7 summarises our main findings.
2  Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
Most prevailing tax legislation in Estonia was enacted during the first phase of transition
reforms. The Law on Taxation entered into effect in 1994 and has since been amended
several times. The Income Tax Act (Tulumaksuseadus) was passed December 15, 1999 and
went into effect on January 2000.
Estonia’s 1994 tax code applied a flat tax rate of 26% to businesses, personal earnings
and capital gains.
1 It contained depreciation allowances of up to 40% for equipment and up
to 8% for buildings. Additionally, there was a loss-carry-forward possibility over a period
of five years. The personal income tax rate was 26%. When companies paid dividends,
they had to pay an additional tax rate of 26/74 (i.e. 26 kroons for every 74 kroons) on net
dividends and shareholders received a dividend tax credit.
2 The effect of this dividend
credit system was that distributed profits were taxed at the shareholder’s personal rate of
income tax rather than under a corporation tax. Thus, the system worked like an imputation
system, where the rate of imputation was the corporation tax rate.
The 2000 income tax act turned Estonia’s income tax approach on its head. Under the
act, resident companies and permanent establishments of foreign entities (including
branches) are subject to income tax for distributions (both actual and deemed).
                                                
1 The tax-free income of a resident natural person is 12,000 Estonian kroons, implying that the marginal
income tax rate is either 0% or 26%, and the average income tax rate is somewhere between 0% and 26%.
2 If the after-tax dividend was 74 kroons, then the corporation had to pay 26 kroons in taxes on the dividend.
The tax rate of 26/74 thus equals a 26 % personal income tax rate. Summaries of the Estonian tax system are
available in Ebrill and Havrylyshyn (1999), IMF (2000), pp. 35-48, Kesti (1995) and Sorainen et al. (2002).
On October 24, 2001 the Estonian Parliament passed amendments to Income Tax Act, which include
modifications to the regulation concerning the taxation of dividends. Since January 1, 2003, all dividends,
regardless of the recipient, are subject to the 26/74 income tax, including dividends paid to resident legal
persons [see Sorainen (2002), p. 99].Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
9
Distributions include dividends and other profit distributions, fringe benefits, gifts,
donations, representation expenses and expenses and payments unrelated to business.
However, the new Estonian corporate income tax does not constitute a tax exemption,
rather the taxation of profits is postponed until a distribution of profits occurs.
The flat tax rate for all distributions is 26/74 on net dividends. The transfer of assets of
the permanent establishment to its head office or to other non-residents is also treated as a
distribution. Dividends paid to non-residents are additionally liable to withholding tax at
the general rate of 26%, unless the non-resident legal entity holds at least 25% of the share
capital of the distributing Estonian company.
3 Under the income tax legislation, therefore,
corporate entities are exempt from income tax on undistributed profits, regardless of
whether these are reinvested or merely retained. Since there are no taxes on corporate
income per se, there is no need for depreciation allowances. Capital gains realised by a
resident corporate entity (including non-resident permanent establishment) are not taxed
until the actual or hidden distribution occurs and ate subject to 26/74 income tax on a
monthly basis. Estonia has no thin capitalisation rules.
3  Comparison of corporate taxation
in Eastern Europe
Table 1 compares the corporate tax rate for retained earnings, the share of corporate taxes
in total tax revenues and the tax depreciation methods applied in twelve Eastern European
transition economies. Eastern European states have implemented a series of corporate tax
reforms, which have been justified mainly in the context of tax competition. Considering
the statutory corporate tax rate for retained earnings, Russia ranks first at 35%, followed by
the Czech Republic at 31%, and then Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia at 25%.
The corporate tax rate for retained earnings is lowest in Estonia (0%).
4 In most countries,
straight-line depreciation can be adopted for machinery and equipment. On the contrary,
geometric-degressive depreciation is usually applied for machinery and equipment in the
Czech Republic and Poland.
5
                                                
3 Bilateral conventions for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion, however, often
state a lower withholding tax. A list of these bilateral conventions can be found at
http://www.fin.ee/doc.php?4057.
4 To analyse the impact of tax cuts, economists have used either a “bottom-up” approach, which looks at the
impact of specific tax changes, or a “top-down” approach, which seeks to measure the relationship between
tax rates and growth over time and in different countries. On the face of it, the Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
provides an ideal laboratory for “bottom-up” research: the tax rate for retained earnings fell from 26% to 0%.
5 As taxes on corporate income per se were eliminated after 1 January 2000 in Estonia, there is no need for
depreciation allowances.Michael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
Dynamic effects of Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
10











Tax Depreciation Rules for
Machinery and Equipment
Bulgaria 15 6.40 Straight-line depreciation in 5 years
Croatia 20 2.57 Straight-line depreciation (4–10 years)
Czech
Republic
31 8.30 Geometric-degressive depreciation
(12 years)
c
Estonia 0 3.58 -
Hungary 18 6.92 Straight-line depreciation (20%)
Latvia 19
a 6.72 Straight-line depreciation (20-40%)
Lithuania 5 3.02 Straight-line depreciation (4-10 years)
Poland 24
b 8.81 Geometric-degressive depreciation (20%)
Romania 25 11.43 Straight-line depreciation in 10 years
Russia 35 11.69 Straight-line depreciation in 4-10 years
Slovak
Republic
25 9.09 Straight-line depreciation in 15 years
Slovenia 25 3.51 Straight-line depreciation in 4-10 years
Notes: a. The Latvian parliament has decided to reduce the corporate tax rate to 15% in 2004. b. The tax rate
will be reduced to 22% in 2004. c. The depreciation rate amounts to 8.33% for the first year and 15.28%,
13.89%, 12.5%, 11.11%, 9.72%, 8.33%, 6.94%, 5.56%, 4.17%, 2.78% and 1.39% for subsequent years. The
share of corporate taxes in total tax revenues in 2000 was calculated using revenue data from the IMF.
Sources: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2002) Corporate Taxes – Worldwide Summaries 2002-2003, New Jersey
(John Wiley & Sons) and IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2001, Washington.
While these tax rates provide an interesting snapshot of corporate taxation around Eastern
Europe, we should remember that a low tax rate does not necessarily mean a low tax
burden. For individual countries, the tax rate must be applied to the tax base to measure tax
burdens. That said, in the absence of harmonised tax bases, a comparison of tax rates only
gives a partial impression of international tax burdens. We therefore also provide the share
of corporate taxes in total tax revenues in 2000.
The comparison reveals that the Estonian corporate tax system provides rather
favourable conditions for investors and tends to promote private investment that is
financed by retained earnings. This positive assessment of corporate taxation in Estonia is
further substantiated by the share of corporate taxes in total tax revenues and the
qualitative tax measures published by the EBRD.
6
                                                
6 See EBRD (2002), pp. 42-43. To assess whether taxation is an obstacle to firm operation and growth, the
EBRD and the World Bank have examined the extent to which firms seek to avoid taxes. In the survey, they
ask businesses to indicate the extent to which firms underreport sales for tax purposes, recognising the diffi-
culty of firms complying with taxes. However, some caution is required in drawing conclusions from such
survey ratings. For instance, like any qualitative rating, they could be influenced by the prevailing sense of
economic optimism and could therefore be closely related to a country’s current macroeconomic perfor-
mance.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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4  A dynamic general equilibrium model
To get a handle on some of the issues raised in the introduction, we develop an
intertemporal closed-economy Ramsey-type model of optimal growth with three sectors:
the state, firms and households. The model covers a variety of taxes on retained earnings,
dividends and consumption, and can thus provide insights into how and to what extent the
2000 income tax act might influence a firm’s investment decisions, output and
consumption. Our decision to exclude consideration of how the financial structure and
financial policies of a firm are affected by the tax reform is motivated by our wish to treat
one difficulty at a time and simplify our analysis. We outline the features of the model in
terms of the objectives and constraints various agents are facing. The model is
deterministic and agents have perfect (point) expectations of future variables.
The representative firm acts optimally and simultaneously chooses its real investment
so as to maximise an objective function. To define the objective function of the firm, we
need to determine its net-of-tax cash flow at each time. The firm is assumed to produce
output with capital, K, and labour, L, using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The
technology parameter A grows at an exogenous rate  and the firm faces expenses for
labour, wL. As a result of these assumptions, and taking the output price as a numeraire,
economic profits of the firm are given by
(1)  ,
1 K wL AL K  
    

where   is the (geometric) economic depreciation rate. We carefully distinguish in the
model between economic depreciation and depreciation for tax purposes. Following Sinn
(1987), tax depreciation is divided up into a part z of gross investment that is written off
immediately and the remainder (1-z) that depreciates at the economic rate. Hence with I
denoting net investment, current depreciation for tax purposes is given by z(I + K) + (1-
z)K or equivalently z(I + K). On the dividend side, gross dividends are defined as
(2)  T I D    ,
where corporate taxes on retained earnings are defined as
(3)  D zI T      .














K wL AL K K D .
The optimal behaviour of the firm depends upon both the personal tax rate and the
corporate tax rate. We therefore define the tax system in terms of these two tax rates. The
first, defined above, is the corporate tax rate for retained earnings (). The second measures
the degree of discrimination between earnings retentions and dividend payments. This “tax
discrimination variable” is denoted by  and is defined as the opportunity cost of retainedMichael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
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earnings in terms of net dividends (D) foregone.
7 Thus, if the Estonian firm distributes
one kroon (EEK), the shareholder receives  EEK in after-tax dividends. For an imputation










where  m is the personal tax rate on dividends. Equation (5) allows a straightforward
taxonomy of corporate tax systems. Dividends are tax-favoured when  > 1, while for  <
1 a preferential tax treatment of retained earnings exist. When  = 1 and z = 0, the
corporate tax system is neutral with respect to retentions and distributions. Firms are
assumed to maximise the discounted stream of after-tax dividends, i.e.




) 1 ( ) 0 ( dv e D V ds s r m
v
t  .
The interest rate r is assumed to be exogenously given for the firm. In choosing its policies,
the firm has to satisfy a number of technological and legal constraints. The most obvious
constraint is that net investment (I) increases the capital stock and therefore the evolution
of capital is given by
(7) I K   .
We can now apply the standard techniques of optimal control theory, and solve the firm’s
maximisation problem or the path of controls, given the tax rate. The necessary first-order
conditions for optimality yields the capital user cost condition
(8)     r z AL K    
   
 1
1 .
Equation (8) equates the net return of spending one EEK for equity versus bonds.
The representative forward-looking household is infinitively lived and maximises














where C denotes consumption  is the time preference rate taken to be constant in all
periods, and 1/ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
8 Thus, the determination of
optimal consumption is fundamentally an intertemporal problem. Note that we are
abstracting from consumer durables here, i.e. consumption services that yield utility are
identical to purchases of consumer goods.
Household financial wealth (W) consists of equity (V) and bonds (B). The
accumulation of bonds is therefore constrained by the dynamic budget constraint
(10) C Z D rB m w m B c) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (            ,
                                                
7 For a detailed discussion, see King (1977), pp. 47-56, and King and Fullerton (1984), pp. 21-22.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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where Z denotes lump-sum transfers from the government and c is the tax on consumption
purchases. Inserting V  obtained from differentiating (6) yields the law of motion for wealth
as
(11)      C Z rW m w m W c         1 1 1  .










The government finances a constant share of government consumption G = gY with tax
earnings and issues of bonds. Given Ricardian equivalence, the path of government debt
necessary to balance the current budget can then be represented by a time series of
transfers. Since labour supply is normalised to one, GDP is obtained as Y = K
A
1-. It is
used for private consumption (C), investment (I) and government consumption (G), i.e. I =
(1-g)K
A
1-  - C - K. Dividing by K and inserting (7) provides capital accumulation
according to
(13)   
    






For equilibrium analysis, we use the following transformed variables: c  C/Y and k 
K/AL. Using this change of variables and inserting r from (8) implies that equation (12)
and (13) can be rewritten as
















     1
,
where  = (1-)/(1-z). Equations (14) and (15) are the two equations of motion driving the
system, together with the transversality condition and initial K(0) and A(0). The unique











 ) 1 /( 1
* k
and
(17)    
    
 * 1 *
1 k g c .
                                                                                                                                                
8 The alternative dynastic interpretation assumes that those making decisions today take the welfare of futureMichael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
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From the linearisation of the above system, we see the model displays a saddle path
dynamic structure, regardless of the tax rate. This implies that adjustment dynamics after a
tax reform are uniquely determined as a movement along a stable manifold. One can also
see from / < 0 and k*/ > 0 that a corporate tax reduction unambiguously increases
the capital stock in efficiency units. This can also be seen in the capital user cost condition
(8), where a tax reduction reduces the tax discrimination variable . The equilibrium
interest rate is given by
(18)     * r .
To evaluate the welfare consequences of a change in tax policy, we report the equivalent
variation (EV) for an infinitively lived household. We normalise A(0) = 1, use (C/K)(K/A)
= ck and write






        
0










      
.
Following Lucas (1990, 2003), we measure the welfare gain as the percentage change in
consumption that equates intertemporal utility from remaining in the pre-reform state
compared to the post-reform state. We solve this numerical problem several times and
decrease the maximum discretisation error of the employed Runge-Kutta method until a
further decrease of the error does not lead to a reduction of the welfare gain by more than
10
-5.
5  Calibration results for the baseline model
In this section, we seek to determine the extent to which the 2000 income tax act promotes
or inhibits investment, consumption and welfare. The analysis is carried out through
calibrations and numerical solutions that account for the effects of government policy
without estimating real-economy parameters for the model. We first pin down the Estonian
benchmark economy using parameters that are “calibrated” from data on actual allocations.
This procedure establishes a benchmark equilibrium with existing tax rules and prices.
Starting from this verified benchmark, we then calculate the effects (unanticipated) of the tax act.
We select the first values for the benchmark model from other calibration exercises,
i.e. we adopt  = 0.33 and  = 0.02. Next, since the capital stock data for Estonia are
unavailable, we set (K/Y)* = 2.0 which is the year 2000 value for Finland. Estonia’s current
GDP growth rates of have to be regarded as a temporary phenomenon, so we set the
equilibrium growth rate to the average German value prior to unification ( = 1.75%). The
economic depreciation rate is set equal to 8.25%. Admittedly, this figure is somewhat
arbitrary, but nevertheless reasonable given that it is below the 10% rate of depreciation
assumed by King and Rebelo (1990) and employed in much of the RBC literature, and
further because it generates a fairly realistic investment ratio of 20%. The value of g is set
to Estonia’s share of government consumption in GDP (0.2) and the pre-reform depreciation
rate for tax purposes to d = 0.4 as in Funke (2002). The pre-reform corporate tax rate for retained
earnings is  = 0.26, and the tax rate of wage and dividend income is m = 0.26. The value-added tax
rate is c = 0.18. For an asset life of ten years, the present value of tax depreciation allowances is
then            
 9
1
10 9 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( t
t t r d r d d  in discrete time. A continuous time approximation
                                                                                                                                                
generations into account.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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is  d r d dt e de y
rt dt    
  
0 1: . The present value of economic tax depreciation allowances is
     r y : 2 , and hence the artificial variable for immediate write-offs, z, solves y1 = z + (1-z)y2.
The benchmark model implies z = 0.72. Since we have already set the equilibrium growth rates, the
capital-output ratio and therefore r*, the remaining parameter  = [(1-)r*-]/ = 3.0 is
endogenously determined. The resulting benchmark parameters are given in Table 2 below. We
assume a particularly simple government sector, i.e. one where the government balances its budget
each period.
9 On the expenditure side, the government uses its proceeds to finance g. All remaining
tax revenues are used for lump-sum transfers to the household sector.
Table 2.  Benchmark parameter values
     g  M d c (K/Y)* (I/Y)*
0.33 0.02 0.0175 3.0 0.082 0.2 0.26 0.26 0.4 0.18 2.0 0.2
In our (unanticipated) policy scenario, we reduce the tax rate for retained earnings
permanently from 26% to 0% and compare the results in all scenarios to the benchmark
steady state equilibrium with the initial tax rate in place.
10 In order to assess the robustness
of the estimates, we executed an extensive sensitivity analysis. Baseline parameter values
are employed in all scenarios, except for the parameter subjected to sensitivity analysis. In
table 3 we report the results.
Table 3.  Estonia’s 2000 income tax act – a quantitative assessment
Parameter (I/Y)* k*      Consumption
Impact      Long Run
                Welfare Gain (EV)
Transitional      Steady State       Net
Benchmark 1.22 9.24 -2.63 0.87 -1.38 0.87 -0.51
gc* = 0.03
a 1.37 9.24 -3.79 0.50 -1.15 0.50 -0.65
gc* = 0.043
b 1.53 9.24 -4.88 0.09 -0.86 0.09 -0.77
(K/Y)* = 2.5 .096 5.76 -2.90 0.09 -0.59 0.09 -0.50
(K/Y)* = 1.5 1.37 13.9 -2.22 2.20 -2.63 2.20 -0.43
d = 0.2 1.91 14.5 -4.24 1.26 -2.02 1.26 -0.76
d = 0.6 0.89 6.71 -1.88 0.65 -1.03 0.65 -0.38
 = 0.01 1.22 9.24 -2.38 0.87 -1.36 0.87 -0.49
 = 0.02 1.22 9.21 -3.42 0.87 -1.43 0.87 -0.57
Notes: The table gives the deviations from pre-reform steady states in percentage points for I/K and in per
cent for other variables; a) gc* = 0.03 implies (I/Y)* = 0.225; b) gc* = 0.043 implies (I/Y)* = 0.25.
                                                
9 The Estonian government is constitutionally obliged to maintain a balanced central budget. To plug revenue
gaps, the government currently plans to introduce protective tariffs against non-EU countries, including the
US. The goal is to confront possible budget deficits without raising interest rates or dampening investment
and growth.
10 The tax discrimination variable prior to the reform is given by  = (1-0.26)/(1-0.26) = 1.0, and  = (1-
0.26)/(1-0.0) = 0.74 effective January 1, 2000. The new tax system therefore implies a preferential treatment
of retained earnings.Michael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
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The “prototypical” benchmark results for  = gc = 0.0175 are given in the first row of Table
3. When reducing the tax rate for retained earnings, equivalent variation declines by 0.51%
over the infinite horizon. What is driving these results is the following. The removal of the
tax rate for retained earnings increases investment expenditures. The increase of
investment has an immediate impact upon consumption. In the short run, consumption
decreases by 2.63% relative to the benchmark (-2.63%). The transitional welfare effect is
also negative (-1.38%). In the long run, however, consumption is increasing by 0.87%
because of the level effect.
11 In other words, the economy is investing more by reducing
consumption in the short- and medium run. This increase in the capital stock does not
occur painlessly.
In order to better understand the impact of the parameters in our model we have also
performed a comprehensive sensitivity analysis reported in the remaining eight rows of
Table 3. The results in Table 3 indicate that the welfare estimates for the same tax cut
ranged up to –0.43% for (K/Y)* = 1.5, and down to –0.77% for gc* = 0.043. The positive
long-run impact upon consumption is also highest for (K/Y)* = 1.5. The sensitivity analysis
illuminates the qualitative robustness of the results. The welfare effect and the impact
effect upon consumption are negative, while the long run impact upon consumption
generally turns out to be positive.
We also summarise the transitional dynamics in Figure 1.
12 To compute the
transitional dynamics, we use the backward integration procedure of Brunner and Strulik
(2002) to rule out explosive behaviour. The procedure uses the backward stability of the
stable manifold and the fact that state variables cannot jump. The analysis begins
arbitrarily close to the post-reform steady state and integrates (13) and (14) backwards
until the capital stock k reaches its pre-reform steady state. A second revision of time then
provides the forward-looking solution using Runge-Kutta methods.
Figure 1.  Transitional dynamics for the benchmark model




























Note: The solid lines represent gc* = 0.0175 (benchmark case), the dashed lines represent gc* = 0.03
                                                
11 Lucas (1990) has estimated that the welfare gain from the elimination of capital income taxation in the US
would equal about 6% of annual consumption when transition effects are ignored, but less than 1% when
transitional costs are taken into account. For comparison, Lucas (1990) notes that this is about 20 times the
gain from eliminating post-war US business cycles. Subsequent papers by King and Rebelo (1990) and Jones
et al. (1993) have tended to confirm these findings.
12 Note that the economy converges only asymptotically to the steady state. We therefore truncate the
transitional dynamics in the effective computation at the horizon T = 50.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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A few comments are in order. The simulation starts in period 0, where the government
suddenly changes the tax rates. This unanticipated policy shock induces a reaction from all
economic variables. Figure 1 shows the time paths of k and c expressed as percentage
deviations from the pre-reform state. Deviations of I/Y from pre-reform steady states are
given in percentage points. The capital stock increases by 9.24% because the 2000 income
tax act provides a more favourable tax treatment for investment.
13 The immediate and
medium-run impact upon consumption is negative (crowding-out effect). While
consumption increases in the long run, the lower income tax does not increase overall
welfare: the equivalent variation corresponding to it is slightly negative. This implies that
the effect of taxation in a dynamic setting is more subtle than often supposed. In particular,
we need to distinguish between the short-term impact and the effects upon the steady state
levels. The increase in GDP is brought about by higher investment. This requires lower
consumption, particularly in the early years of the simulation, and lowers welfare. In other
words, the results remind us that increasing investment does not necessarily increase
welfare – higher consumption in the long run can only be achieved at the cost of lower
consumption in the present. And so a trade-off has to be made. The final graph indicates
that the growth rate of the economy (gy) increases during transition dynamics. Over time,
however, the growth rate gradually declines and converges again to the (exogenous)
growth rate.
As an additional thought experiment, one can interpret the immortal representative
individual as a dynasty, where an individual born s years after the tax reform has utility
  dt e t C U s
t 
  ) ( . This modification allows us to attribute losses to different generations. In
Figure 2 we assume that a new generation is born every year. For the sake of brevity, we
present only the results for the benchmark case. The results indicate that the current
generation bears the main burden of the reform. The break-even occurs approximately at t
= 5. Generations born six years after the reform already enjoy beneficial welfare effects.
Figure 2.  Generational distribution of  welfare gains and losses










The graph indicates that the country is facing the problem of determining the optimal
trade-off between consumption and investment across generations. This conclusion is
important for policy purposes. Clearly, the choice of a tax reform strategy plays a critical
part in meeting wider generational and social objectives.
                                                
13 This increase is slightly more pronounced than the increase in Funke (2002).Michael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
Dynamic effects of Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
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6  Foreign direct investment
The three-sector model used in section 5 clearly offers plenty of opportunities for
improvement. One can argue, for example, that the results are incomplete since our
benchmark model is for a closed economy, i.e. Estonia is assumed to live in financial
autarky and therefore investment expenditures have to be financed by the sacrifice of
domestic consumption over time. Thus, we now consider an augmented open economy
version of our model by allowing for foreign direct investment (FDI).
14
We introduce FDI by assuming that a constant fraction of total investment in Estonia
originates from abroad. Let this fraction be denoted by 	. Consequently, foreigners own a
constant fraction 	 of the total capital stock, and by implication a constant fraction 	 of a
representative firm’s shares. Hence, the firm side of the model remains unchanged except
from the fact the V now denotes the value of shares held by Estonians and foreigners.
The Estonian household consumption plan, i.e. the Ramsey rule, also remains
unchanged. To see this, note that the representative Estonian household now holds a
constant fraction (1-	) of shares and receives dividends (1-	)D. Hence
V B W    ) 1 (     implies
(20)      C Z rW m w m W c         1 1 1 
after insertion of V  obtained from (6). This is the same dynamic budget constraint as in the
original model and thus equation (15) remains valid. This, in turn, implies that the
introduction of FDI does not change the equilibrium capital stock, which is determined by
tax rates and parameters of preference and technology.
The occurrence of FDI, however, reduces national income (GNP). Since foreigners
own a fraction 	 of Estonia’s capital stock, a share 	 of dividends flows into foreign
countries at any point in time. GNP is obtained as  D L K      1  and is used for private
consumption, investment, and government expenditures.
15 Hence, I = (1-g)K
A
1- - C - K





















which replaces (14). Note that (21) reduces to (14) for 	 = 0. Steady state consumption is
obtained as






   
 1 * 1 *
1 k g c ,
                                                
14 To keep things tractable, we overlook all aspects of maximization in the Rest-of-the-World. This would
complicate the model without providing additional insights for the purpose at hand. Hines (1999) and the
OECD (2001) have shown the increasing sensitivity of FDI to country tax burdens, consistent with trends
towards globalisation. Agreements on the avoidance of double taxation of income and capital, based on the
OECD model agreement, have been concluded between Estonia and the following countries: Belarus,
Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the US. Agreements
with France and Italy await ratification.
15 The term D represents the term “Factor Payments to Abroad” in the National Accounts.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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implying


















where we have used k* to obtain the right hand sides. A sufficient condition for this
derivative to be negative is   1, which is almost surely satisfied for reasonable parameter
values.
16 Therefore, if we are willing to focus on comparisons of steady states and ignore
transitional effects, FDI unambiguously lowers Estonian steady state consumption for
reasonable parameter values.
FDI also influences consumption and welfare through a second channel. If foreigners
undertake part of Estonia’s investment, we should expect a less dramatic reaction in
consumption following the increase of investment caused by the corporate tax cut. Further,
we may expect a faster adjustment after a shock, which again leads to a less pronounced
transitional welfare loss. To verify these propositions, we reconsider our policy experiment
by assuming that foreigners own 20-30% of Estonia’s capital stock.
17 The results are
summarised in Table 4 and Figure 3.
Table 4.  The Impact of FDI  – a quantitative assessment
Parameter (I/Y)* k*      Consumption
Impact      Long Run
                Welfare Gain (EV)
Transitional      Steady State       Net
Benchmark 1.22 9.24 -2.63 0.87 -1.38 0.87 -0.51
 = 0.2 1.22 9.24 -2.39 1.05 -1.34 1.05 -0.29
 = 0.3 1.22 9.24 -2.26 1.15 -1.32 1.15 -0.18
Note: The table gives the deviations from pre-reform steady states in percentage points for I/K and in per cent
for other variables.
This results confirm the above intuition. Transitional dynamics are less painful because
consumption falls less in the early years relative to the benchmark case. The ability of the
country to attract FDI, and therefore borrow on international capital markets, helps
consumers smooth their consumption. The impact of FDI is also visible from the
transitional dynamics in Figure 3 where the solid (dashed) lines indicate adjustment
without (with) FDI.
                                                
16 Hall (1988) and Ogaki and Reinhard (1998) provide evidence that the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/ is well below one.
17 0.2 <  < 0.3 is consistent with the net inflow of foreign direct investment into Estonia. Estonia is one of
the few transition economies with sufficient FDI outflows to produce a significant difference between the
gross and net figures. At the beginning of the 1990s, FDI in the Baltic states was closely correlated with
privatisation receipts. More recently, the Baltics have begun to attract substantial non-privatisation-related
FDI inflows. See EBRD (2001, 2003).Michael Funke and Holger Strulik Taxation, growth and welfare:
Dynamic effects of Estonia’s 2000 income tax act
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Figure 3. Transitional dynamics with and without FDI
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7  Conclusions
The general reputation of economists for disagreeing with each other and serving up
politically expedient theories on everything is only partly deserved. Many purported
economists would never be considered colleagues in more serious circles and the extent of
disagreement among the brightest scholars is often exaggerated outside the academic
community. Nonetheless, such charges should make any economist somewhat self-
conscious. Here, for example, we have applied a rigorous mathematical footing to the
highly controversial real world problem of setting tax policy. We have constructed and
calibrated a dynamic general equilibrium growth model that could offer plausible
predictions about the impact of Estonia’s 2000 income tax reform.
18 Overall, it appears the
tax reform benefits the investment climate and fares quite favourably in the long run.
19
Hopefully, this will pave the way for empirical work aimed at identifying tax impacts upon
investment spending of firms in Estonia.
20
                                                
18 The welfare effects we estimate in our model are a combination of level effects and transitional dynamics;
they are not the result of a different steady-state growth path. Strulik (2003b) shows that the welfare effects
of tax changes in endogenous growth models are quite similar to those in growth models with exogenous
technological progress.
19 We have abstracted from the question of the credibility of the reform. A more favourable tax treatment of
capital generally encourages the accumulation of capital, but only if investors believe that the lower rates will
remain in place. However, once the private sector has build up the capital stock in response to lower tax rates,
the government faces an incentive to raise the tax rates on capital. Investors will realise this incentive and so
will be wary of betting too much on the persistence of lower tax rates into the future.
20 The calibration results indicate it will be important in such empirical work to distinguish between
transitional dynamics and long-run steady-state tendencies.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2003
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